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ADDRESSING LIABILITY AND CLINICAL DECISION SUPPORT:
A FEDERAL GOVERNMENT ROLE
JODI G. DANIEL*
I. INTRODUCTION
Health information technology (“HIT”) has the power to improve the
delivery of health care and bring needed information to the health care
provider at the point of care. This includes information about the patient
from disparate sources. Clinical decision support (“CDS”) facilitates the use
of this patient information, combined with medical knowledge, to support
decision making by healthcare providers with the aim of improved quality of
care and patient safety. The consequences of effective CDS are farreaching: where does the computer’s advice become an essential
component of clinical decision-making? How do we maintain confidence
that the guidance offered by the computer is aligned with best practices?
When is it acceptable for the clinician to ignore the advice of a CDS
intervention? Liability concerns are a backdrop to many of these questions.
The article by Susan Ridgely and Michael Greenberg, Too Many Alerts,
Too Much Liability: Sorting Through the Malpractice Implications of DrugDrug Interaction Clinical Decision Support,1 was part of the Advancing
Clinical Decision Support initiative sponsored by the Office of the National
Coordinator for Health Information Technology (“ONC”) at the U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”). The initiative focused
in part on the issue of “alert fatigue”–in which excessive numbers of alerts
may result in health care providers ignoring or turning off important CDS
functionality.2 The Ridgely and Greenberg article explores liability concerns
raised by alert fatigue for electronic health record (“EHR”) developers and
users.3 They have advanced the issues related to liability and drug-drug
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1. M. Susan Ridgely & Michael D. Greenberg, Too Many Alerts, Too Much Liability:
Sorting Through the Malpractice Implications of Drug-Drug Interactions Clinical Decision
Support, 5 ST. LOUIS U. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 257, 257, 259 (2012).
2. Id. at 259.
3. Id.
325
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interactions (“DDI”), and they have identified potential solutions.4 ONC
funded this work; however, the authors’ statements and views do not
represent the policies or positions of ONC.
This response explores the role of the federal government, the proposals
made by Ridgely and Greenberg, and a proposed way of thinking about
liability and clinical decision support from the federal government
perspective.
II. FEDERAL GOVERNMENT ROLE
The healthcare industry has been slow to adopt information technology,
including electronic health records (“EHRs”), as compared to other
industries, despite the call for adoption to improve health care quality.5 As
a result, the federal government stepped in to promote adoption and
“meaningful use”6 of HIT under the Health Information Technology for
Economic and Clinical Health Act of 2009 (“HITECH”) through Medicare
and Medicaid incentive programs.7 Beginning in 2011, eligible
professionals and hospitals that achieve meaningful use of “certified EHR
technology”8 and complete an attestation process receive payments.9 These
programs are led by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (“CMS”)
in close collaboration with the ONC.10 ONC adopts standards and criteria
for EHR technology.11
CDS has been the subject of greater interest as HHS has moved to
promote EHR adoption. Among the requirements for the technology is to
“implement automated, electronic CDS rules (in addition to drug-drug and
drug-allergy contraindication checking) based on the data elements
4. See id. at 278.
5. See COMM. ON PATIENT SAFETY & HEALTH INFO. TECH., INST. OF MED., HEALTH IT AND
PATIENT SAFETY: BUILDING SAFER SYSTEMS FOR BETTER CARE, 1-2 to 1-5 (2011) [hereinafter
HEALTH IT AND PATIENT SAFETY], available at http://www.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=
13269&page=13.
6. 42 C.F.R. §§ 495.4, .6, .8 (2010); see also CMS EHR Meaningful Use Overview,
CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, https://www.cms.gov/EHRIncentivePrograms/
30_Meaningful_Use.asp (last visited Mar. 23, 2012).
7. The Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health (HITECH) Act
comprises Title XIII of Division A and Title IV of Division B of the American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act (ARRA) of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115 (to be codified in
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). Particularly relevant are HITECH Act §§ 4001-4101, 4103,
4201, 123 Stat. at 467, 470, 487.
8. 45 C.F.R. § 170.102.
9. 42 C.F.R. Parts 412, 413, 422 et al., Medicare and Medicaid Programs. Electronic
Health Record Incentive Program Final Rule.
10. Medicare and Medicaid Programs; Electronic Health Record Incentive Program, 75
Fed. Reg. 44,314, 44,316 (July 28, 2010) (codified at 42 C.F.R. §§ 412, 413, 422, 495).
11. 45 C.F.R. § 170 subparts B and C (2011).
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included in: problem lists; medication lists; demographics; and laboratory
test results.”12 For a provider or hospital to receive incentive payments, they
must use certified EHR technology that includes this functionality and
“implement one clinical decision support rule.”13
There also are
requirements related to computerized provider order entry (“CPOE”) for
medication orders and for drug-drug and drug-allergy interaction checks.14
These elements are critical to the objectives of the programs as the focus is
not only on adoption but also on meaningful use of HIT. Many of the
benefits of the technology are only achieved when there is intelligence built
in to inform decisions and when health care providers use this intelligence to
improve health care delivery and patient outcomes. “If implemented
correctly, alerts can improve patient safety.”15 Therefore, effective CDS is an
important component of EHRs and critical to effectuate meaningful use.16
Medication-related CDS that includes a DDI list is an important tool to
reduce adverse drug events.
In general, the federal government has an important, but limited, role in
influencing the market, and acts when there is a legitimate public purpose
and authority for doing so. The federal government has intervened for the
following reasons, among others: (1) market forces are not producing an
outcome that is of widespread public benefit; (2) a market failure is allowing
persistent inefficiencies; (3) it is more efficient for the government than the
private sector to act to address a public need; or (4) it is necessary to
protect the public. While in some cases it is appropriate for the government
to step in to address these types of concerns, it is prudent to limit such
intervention to no more than that which is necessary to address the problem.
Many efforts currently underway involve leveraging public-private
partnerships to develop the appropriate balance between government and
the private sector.17
In the case of CDS and liability, there seem to be appropriate roles that
the federal government may take because of its interest in consumer
protection and a failure of the market to address this concern. As Ridgely
and Greenberg point out, the research shows that adoption of CDS,
including clinical alerts, appears to reduce the rates of adverse drug
12. 45 C.F.R. § 170.304(e) and § 170.306(c) (2011).
13. 42 C.F.R. § 495.6(d)(11)(ii), (f)(10)(ii) (2010).
14. 45 C.F.R. § 170.302(a) (2011).
15. HEALTH IT AND PATIENT SAFETY, supra note 5, at 2-10.
16. Id. at 2-9.
17. See, e.g., Public Private Partnership Tools, FEMA, http://www.fema.gov/private
sector/ppp_tools.shtm (last visited Jan. 17, 2012) (encouraging public private partnerships);
see Partnership Provides Health IT Training and Electronic Health Records, THE OFF. OF
MINORITY HEALTH, http://minorityhealth.hhs.gov/templates/content.aspx?lvl=1&lvlID=46&ID
=9241(last visited Feb. 2, 2012).
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events.18 They also argue that concerns about liability and CDS may result
in risk avoidance behaviors of various players.19 If the CDS is designed in a
way that causes users to ignore interventions because they are too often
irrelevant and unhelpful, then there are two unintended consequences.
First, patients who could have been helped by information provided through
this technology are not helped, and medical errors that could have been
avoided are not avoided. ONC has an interest in alert fatigue because of
its interest in using HIT to improve healthcare outcomes. Second, as Ridgely
and Greenberg describe, health care providers who ignore interventions
may be faced with a new source of liability risk if it can be shown that the
interventions could have prevented injuries.20 This is important to ONC
because the fear of increased liability–even if unfounded–has been raised as
a concern by health care providers21 and may impact adoption of EHRs.
Ridgely and Greenberg researched a specific kind of CDS (alerts) in a
specific domain (drug-drug interactions).22 It is not clear, however, that their
findings generalize to all types of CDS. Osheroff and colleagues define ten
types of CDS.23 Ridgely and Greenberg’s focus on just one of these types of
CDS intervention, without consideration of the others, limits their analysis
and their conclusions.
In the case of DDI alerts and liability, the market has not developed a
solution for the liability risk. This failure impedes quality and safety
improvements in health care. Ridgely and Greenberg note that “the HIT
vendor market has not produced a solution to over-inclusive DDI warnings,

18.
19.
20.
21.

Ridgely & Greenberg, supra note 1, at 261.
Id. at 262.
Id. at 268.
American Health Information Community (AHIC), U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVICES, http://healthit.hhs.gov/portal/server.pt?open=512&mode=2&cached=true&objID
=1199&PageID=15512 (last visited Mar. 27, 2012); Electronic Health Records Workgroup,
U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, http://healthit.hhs.gov/portal/ server.pt/community/
ahic_workgroups/1201/electronic_health_records/15527 (last visited January 29, 2012);
AHIC Workgroups, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, http://healthit.hhs.gov/portal/
server.pt/community/ahic_workgroups/1201/home/15523; see also U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVS., THE COMMUNITY: AMERICAN HEALTH INFORMATION COMMUNITY 14, 23 (2008).
22. Ridgely & Greenberg, supra note 1, at 257.
23. JEROME A. OSHEROFF ET AL., IMPROVING OUTCOMES AND CLINICAL DECISION SUPPORT:
AN IMPLEMENTER’S GUIDE (2011). CDS during data-entry tasks (Smart Documentation Forms,
Order Sets, Care Plans and Protocols, Parameter Guidance, Critiques and Warnings –
“Immediate Alerts”), CDS during data-review tasks (Relevant Data Summaries (Single-patient),
Multi-patient Monitors, Predictive and Retrospective Analytics), CDS during assessment and
understanding tasks (Filtered Reference Information and Knowledge Resources, Expert Workup
and Management Advisors), CDS not triggered by a user task (Event-driven Alerts (Datatriggered) and Reminders (Time-triggered)).
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or to the well-documented problem of physician alert fatigue.”24 They assert
that vendors and presumably content developers are “creating CDS systems
that generate massively over-inclusive automated warnings” and then using
contract terms to shift liability for the use of the EHR to the users without
regard for the possible vendor contribution to alert fatigue.25
Indemnification clauses, disclaimers, and limitations on damages that
reduce the vendor’s liability for alert fatigue are common EHR contract
terms. The authors suggest, but do not fully explore, how these contract
terms may reduce the need for the EHR vendors to find solutions for the
problem of alert fatigue by relieving them of liability for their own poor
design or poor content. This point deserves additional policy consideration.
The policy problem raised by concerns of liability for CDS is not the
potential for liability itself but that the fear of liability will negatively impact
design, clinical content, EHR adoption, and EHR implementation.
In Health IT and Patient Safety: Building Safer Systems for Better Care,
commissioned by ONC, the Institute of Medicine (“IOM”) highlights broader
safety risks and asserts that HHS should work with a variety of stakeholders
to mitigate the risks and make HIT-enabled care safer. 26 In this report,
IOM provided a set of recommendations, which HHS is currently evaluating
as it develops a safety plan.27 The issue of alert fatigue and the potential
impact on patient safety may appropriately be considered in this plan.
III. PROPOSED STRATEGIES AND CHALLENGES
Given the primacy of health care quality and patient safety, the goal
should be to figure out how to improve the likelihood that the most
important CDS interventions are viewed and considered by clinicians. There
are a number of players that are potentially liable if there is a problem with
CDS or if it is not viewed or used: software designers, the providers of the
medical knowledge used by the system, and the end users, i.e., the health
care providers. Each of these players is likely to make decisions to minimize
its risk of liability. However, actions based on risk avoidance do not
necessarily result in the best and safest care for the patient.
The first strategy proposed by Ridgely and Greenberg is the creation of a
standard for the content of a particular form of alert—the creation of a DDI
list.28 Three of the other strategies involve mechanisms to endorse this list
through various policies.29 The second recommendation is for regulation of
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Ridgely & Greenberg, supra note 1, at 259.
Id. at 262.
See HEALTH IT AND PATIENT SAFETY, supra note 5, at S-2, 6-3 to 6-5.
Id. at 6-11 to 6-13.
Ridgely & Greenberg, supra note 1, at 279.
Id. at 286, 289-90.
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CDS tools by the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”).30 This would be
oversight of both the content and design of CDS.
I agree with the authors that consensus on a clinically significant DDI list
could help address problems of liability. However, I also agree with the
authors that achieving and maintaining such a consensus would likely be
challenging.31 It would be very challenging to develop and maintain
standard content for CDS, and DDI specifically, as medical knowledge
changes rapidly. In the case of the creation and maintenance of a DDI list,
it is likely that the creation is best done by experts in the field, not the federal
government. As they state, it requires finding a willing group of
organizations to take on such an effort and to develop a system for updating
the list over time.32 They note that this would likely require government
involvement and funding, which may be challenging in the current economic
environment. 33 This is only exacerbated by the fact that it would be difficult
to obtain consensus on a common DDI list, and creating and maintaining
such a list would likely be time consuming and expensive. In addition, the
emergence of personalized medicine means that there will be increasing
complexity of information regarding drug interactions in relation to genetic
profiles further complicating the creation of a DDI list.34
The second approach, FDA oversight of CDS as a device, may address
concerns of liability, but raises other challenges. The IOM report highlights
that the safety and improvements in care that can be delivered through HIT
require considerations of the socio-technical system in which the EHR
operates.35 This includes considering not just the technology, but also the
people, processes, organizations, and external environments.36 For
example, even if the technology has the right information in it, the way it is
implemented, or the processes for use can impact its effectiveness.
Therefore, regulating the technology may address the liability issue up to a
point, but may not necessarily solve the safety and effectiveness problem. In
addition, in a market that is emerging and changing rapidly, such as HIT,
there have been concerns raised about the appropriate balance of
government oversight and market innovation.37 Regulation may add
complexity and delays in updating and maintaining products as knowledge
changes. The IOM considered the role of FDA oversight of HIT from a
30. Id. at 281.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Ridgely & Greenberg, supra note 1, at 281.
34. Wolfgang Sadée & Zunyan Dai, Pharmacogenetics/Genomics and Personalized
Medicine, 14 HUM. MOLECULAR GENETICS 207, 207, 210 (2005).
35. See HEALTH IT AND PATIENT SAFETY, supra note 5, at 3-2 to 3-4.
36. Id. at 3-3 to 3-4.
37. Id. at 6-12.
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safety perspective.38 They were concerned that the “FDA framework is
oriented toward conventional, out-of-the-box, turnkey devices” and that
such oversight may stifle innovation.39 They specifically recommended that
the FDA not regulate at this time, but recommended re-evaluating this
position if other mechanisms for safety prove ineffective.40 Given the IOM’s
recommendations, it is unlikely that the FDA will, in the short run, actively
regulate CDS as a medical device using its existing authority. However,
software developers may be well advised, from a liability perspective, to
consider certain FDA guidance and regulations, including human factors
guidance, and pending guidance from ONC regarding quality management
best practices, as reflecting a developed federal standard.
IV. NEW STRATEGIES TO CONSIDER AND THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT’S ROLE
Ridgely and Greenberg provide evidence of a problem, whereby fears of
liability result in DDI alerts (and arguably CDS) that may not support
providers in delivering the best care to patients, and therefore, of a need for
solutions to address the problem.41 There is also a valid basis for the
federal government to take steps to address this problem in order to support
improved clinical care and meaningful use of EHR. It is best for the
government action to be limited to that which is necessary to address the
failure or need that exists. There may be opportunities for federal
government involvement to support the solution that is less heavy-handed,
with fewer potential unintended consequences. These approaches include
focusing on user-centered design and collaborating with public and private
stakeholders to understand and address concerns and actions that are
counter to safety goals.
First, it would be valuable to consider some creative solutions to the
problem of DDI alert fatigue, which results from conservative, risk-averse
behavior on the part of the relevant players. Human computer interaction
research, i.e., human factors research and user-centered design, could
provide helpful lessons for DDI alerts and CDS more broadly. The National
Institute for Standards and Technology (“NIST”) has released an EHR
Usability Protocol (“EUP”) identifying alert fatigue as a usability problem.42
The IOM recommended that HHS specify the “quality management

38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Id. at S-9.
Id. at S-10.
HEALTH IT AND PATIENT SAFETY, supra note 5, at S-10.
Ridgely & Greenberg, supra note 1, at 262.
NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, NISTIR 7804,
TECHNICAL EVALUATION, TESTING AND VALIDATION OF THE USABILITY OF ELECTRONIC HEALTH
RECORDS (2012), available at http://www.nist.gov/healthcare/usability/upload/EUP_WERB_
Version_2_23_12-Final-2.pdf.
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principles” that HIT vendors must adopt, with a particular focus on human
factors, safety culture, and usability.”43 There may be opportunities to
design systems that provide the most relevant support to health care
providers without over-inclusive alerts. Ridgely and Greenberg consider the
DDI alerting challenges, which is only one aspect of the expansive domain
that CDS encompasses.44 For example, while CDS can involve “pop-up”
alerts or messages, it may also be instantiated as the prioritization of various
selections to make the preferred choice more prevalent, or pre-selecting
drugs or procedures in an order set that are most consistent with
guidelines.45 Effective CDS involves using design to affect provider
decision-making that improves care and outcomes. The federal government
can play a role in promoting user-centered design that focuses on areas of
patient safety, particularly with respect to CDS. This may result in effective
CDS that does not lead to alert fatigue.
Second, we should consider directly addressing the problems of liability,
or fear of liability. It would be valuable to look at the issues of contracting
to determine if there are ways to align liability risks with the party most able
to mitigate the risks. It would also be valuable to determine if there are
ways of setting guidelines to establish a reasonable process for developing
CDS in order to minimize the risks to those assuming them. An effective way
for determining a solution to this complex problem with a variety of
stakeholders with different incentives is to bring together the stakeholders–
including the clinical knowledge providers, the EHR vendors, the health care
providers and systems, malpractice insurers, and other liability insurers–to
develop approaches and options that would work together to manage risk
for all while focusing on improving patient safety and outcomes. The best
solutions may only emerge when all of the relevant players work together to
identify solutions and the entities that are best suited to implement those
solutions. The federal government may play a valuable role in bringing a
focus to this issue, helping to convene stakeholders, and collaborating with
stakeholders to develop solutions or to set mutually agreed to guidelines.
V. CONCLUSION
Ridgely and Greenberg have done a great service in describing the
liability risks borne by physicians, hospitals, other health care organizations,
and EHR software vendors and clinical knowledge providers as well as the
43. HEALTH IT AND PATIENT SAFETY, supra note 5, at 6-19.
44. See generally Ridgely & Greenberg, supra note 1.
45. Adam Wright et al., Development and Evaluation of a Comprehensive Clinical
Decision Support Taxonomy: Comparison of Front-End Tools in Commercial and Internally
Developed Electronic Health Record Systems, 18 J. AM. MED. INFORMATICS ASS’N 232, 237,
239 (2011).
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impact on DDI lists and CDS. Their determination that there is very little
actual liability related to drug-drug interaction software should reduce
defensiveness and encourage a dialogue about solutions to the problem of
alert fatigue. Patient safety and the reduction of medical errors should be
the focus of concern. It is critical that we create a culture of safety that
promotes actions that support patient safety. ONC looks forward to
fostering and participating in that dialogue.
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